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Many countries have implemented national climate policies to accomplish pledged Nationally
Determined Contributions and to contribute to the temperature objectives of the Paris
Agreement on climate change. In 2023, the global stocktake will assess the combined effort
of countries. Here, based on a public policy database and a multi-model scenario analysis, we
show that implementation of current policies leaves a median emission gap of 22.4 to 28.2
GtCO2eq by 2030 with the optimal pathways to implement the well below 2 °C and
1.5 °C Paris goals. If Nationally Determined Contributions would be fully implemented, this
gap would be reduced by a third. Interestingly, the countries evaluated were found to not
achieve their pledged contributions with implemented policies (implementation gap), or to
have an ambition gap with optimal pathways towards well below 2 °C. This shows that all
countries would need to accelerate the implementation of policies for renewable technolo-
gies, while efficiency improvements are especially important in emerging countries and fossil-
fuel-dependent countries.
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The objective of the Paris Climate Agreement is to holdaverage global warming to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the tem-
perature increase to 1.5 °C1. While this objective is formulated at
the global level, the success of the agreement critically depends on
the implementation of climate policies at the national level. This
is organised in the agreement by the requirement of countries to
submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Countries
are expected to update their NDCs in 2020. While NDCs should
be submitted by every country and updated every five years, their
policies and targets are not legally binding. Previous studies have
highlighted that taken together, the NDCs and national policies
fall significantly short of the overall ambition of the Paris
Agreement2–4. To achieve the targets from the NDCs, countries
are implementing policies at the national level. The Paris
Agreement facilitates a global stocktake in 2023, which is
expected to take stock of the collective efforts and to inform the
preparation of more ambitious NDCs. For this, clear insights are
needed into the impact of current implemented national policies
from individual countries. At the moment, no peer reviewed lit-
erature exists that has assessed the global and country impact of
national climate policies on the basis of a comprehensive policy
inventory by using a suite of integrated assessment models, and
using this to guide additional policy implementation. Such a
multi-model approach using a range of model types (simulation/
optimisation, general or partial equilibrium) adds to the robust-
ness of the assessment.
The aim of this article is to fill this knowledge gap and to
provide insights into the impact of national policies in compar-
ison to emission pathways consistent with the NDCs and overall
goals of the Paris Agreement. Consequently, we divide the total
emissions gap between national policies and well below 2 °C
pathways into an implementation gap referring to the difference
between the impact of national policies and the NDCs, and an
ambition gap referring to the difference between the impact of the
NDCs and well below 2 °C emission pathways. The results are
presented for seven large economies and the world. The analysis
was done by first establishing a list of high-impact policies5 for
each G20 economy selected from a detailed open-access policy
database6, and translating these to input parameters for inte-
grated assessment models. Subsequently, the model results
allowed to assess the direct impact of these policies, as well as
their interactions. The results are also presented in terms of the
Kaya identity allowing to indicate how to close the imple-
mentation and ambition gaps7,8. The nine integrated assessment
models (see Methods) used in this study have all submitted data
for the 1.5 °C scenarios to the IPCC 1.5 °C report9. To evaluate
the coherence of the national pathways, we compared the
aggregated results of the integrated assessment models with
similar runs of national models for the same countries.
Model-based scenarios have played a major role in supporting
international climate policy already for a few decades. The focus
of model analyses, however, has been mostly on exploring cost-
optimal response strategies required to meet the climate tem-
perature goals and simplified representations of national policies,
typically incorporating them as overall emission reduction targets
implemented via carbon prices10–12. The new phase of climate
policy after Paris requires new information on the long-term
contribution of specific policies. While some assessments have
accounted for more explicit climate policy formulations in dif-
ferent parts of the world, these are typically single model exercises
or focus only on the NDCs11,13–16. As such, the current work
adds to the literature.
Owing to the aggregation level of most IAMs, our analysis is
limited to the national policies and NDCs for G20 economies that
represent 75% of total 2010 greenhouse gas emissions. It is
estimated that the countries with high-impact policies, but not
included in our assessment, represent around 5% of global 2010
emissions (see Supplementary Table 1). The collected policies
have been made available in an open-access database6 and cover
implemented and planned national policies up to 2017. As
introduction of new policies mostly occurs simultaneously with
key international accords17, this inventory contains most of the
relevant policies that were introduced around the Paris Agree-
ment. A selection from this database was made that consisted of
around ten policies for each G20 country that were expected to
have high impact on greenhouse gas emissions based on literature
or national expert opinion, that were adopted by national gov-
ernments trough legislation or executive orders, and no evidence
exists of large barriers to implementation. The results are pre-
sented at the global level and for the seven large emitting
economies for which national models were available, i.e., Brazil,
China, the European Union, India, Japan, the Russian Federation
and the United States, together representing around 65% of global
2010 greenhouse gas emissions18.
The results show that if no additional action is taken beyond
current implemented national climate policies, greenhouse gas
emissions are projected to increase substantially between 2015
and 2030, although 5.3% lower compared to the hypothetical
situation if these policies would not have been implemented.
Current national policies together, leave a median global total
emissions gap by 2030 of 22.4 Gigaton CO2 equivalent (GtCO2eq)
with a cost-optimal 2 °C emission pathway, and 28.2 GtCO2eq
with a 1.5 °C pathway. The 2 °C global emissions gap can be
reduced by a third, if conditional NDCs were fully implemented,
which would close the global implementation gap, but would still
leave a significant ambition gap. For seven large individual
countries (China, the United States, India, the European Union,
Japan, Brazil and the Russian Federation), policy implementation
is expected to reduce emissions at the national level by 0 to 9%
(median estimates) compared to the hypothetical situation if no
policies would be implemented. This leaves a small imple-
mentation gap for China, India, Japan, Russian Federation as they
are close to achieving their NDC, while this is not the case for the
European Union, United States and Brazil, but their ambition gap
is smaller as NDCs are close to the cost-optimal 2 °C pathways.
Results
Global implementation and total emissions gap. In total, five
scenarios were evaluated (see Table 1 and Supplementary Note 1).
The starting point of all scenarios is the SSP2 scenario19,20, which
is a middle-of-the-road scenario assuming a business-as-usual
conduct representing no new climate policies implementation
after 2010 (no new policies scenario). The national policies sce-
nario represents the impact of policies implemented domestically
to fulfil the NDC promises that are included in the NDC scenario.
The 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios look into cost-optimal imple-
mentation of the overall goals of the Paris Agreement. To provide
guidance on enhancing policy implementation, the impact of
policies is decomposed by computing a set of indicators based on
the Kaya identity (see Supplementary Note 2). Besides greenhouse
gas emissions, also the share of low-carbon (no fossil-fuels
without carbon capture and storage) technologies and energy
efficiency is presented.
Under the No new policies scenario, the models project an
increase in global greenhouse gas emissions to 63.9 GtCO2eq
(61.0–69.1; median and 10th to 90th percentile range over all
model results) by 2030. This is mostly driven by an increase in
emissions related to transport, industry and power production in
developing countries, but still to lower per-capita levels than
developed countries. Implementation of national policies is not
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projected to reverse the increase of global emissions by 2030, and
would result in emission levels of 59.3 GtCO2eq (58.4–63.7)
(Fig. 1), which is a 5.3% (3.8%–7.9%) reduction relative to the No
new policies scenario (see Table 2). However, it covers 15.4%
(10.8%–19.0%) of the emissions gap between No new policies and
the 2 °C pathway by 2030, and this is 11% (7.6%–15.9%) for the
1.5 °C pathway.
Although the global low-carbon share of final energy under the
National Policies scenario increases by 1 percentage point (1 pp)
to 14.3% (9.3%–19.8%) by 2030, and the energy intensity
improves by 20.5% (16.1%–24.7%) between 2015 and 2030, final
energy use still increases (see Fig. 2). Most emission reductions
under the National policies scenario are induced by high-impact
policies that target CO2 emissions (Fig. 1). Furthermore, 45%
(30–70%) of the emission reductions are projected to come from
countries that are member of the the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
For achieving conditional NDCs, deeper reductions are
necessary than those achieved by national policies only. The
implementation of conditional NDCs (NDC scenario) is
projected to result in 51.9 (50.4–57.4) GtCO2eq greenhouse gas
emissions by 2030, a low-carbon share of final energy at 16.8%
(12.6%–25.2%), and 23.5% (17.9%–30.0%) in energy-intensity
improvement between 2015 and 2030. This means that national
Table 1 Main assumptions on climate policy implementation per scenario.
Scenario Policy assumptions
Until 2030 After 2030
No new policies None None
National policies Implementation of current domestic policies Equivalent effort to policy implementation
before 2030
NDCs Full implementation of conditional national NDCs Equivalent effort to NDC implementation
before 2030
2 °C/1.5 °C Each country implements current implemented polices until 2020 and starts with
cost-effective implementation to achieve the 2 °C/1.5 °C target between 2020
and 2030 with high (>66%) probability, thereby staying within a global carbon
budget of 1000 GtCO2 and 400 GtCO2 in the 2011–2100 period
Continuation of cost-effective implementation
to achieve the 2 °C/1.5 °C target
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Fig. 1 Greenhouse gas emissions on a global level and seven large countries under different scenarios. a Global greenhouse gas emissions for total
greenhouse gases (in GtCO2eq) and nine integrated assessment models between 2010 and 2030. b Average greenhouse gas emissions (in MtCO2eq) of
all models by 2010, 2015 and 2030 for CO2 emissions per sector and total non-CO2 emissions (blue), including the 10th–90th percentile ranges for total
greenhouse gas emissions of the multi-model ensemble (error bars). CO2 emissions have been separated into those related to energy supply (red),
transport (dark orange), buildings (light orange), industry (yellow) and AFOLU (agriculture, afforestation, forestry and land-use change) (green). National
models are China-TIMES and IPAC for China, GCAM-USA for the United States, PRIMES for the EU, AIM India and India MARKAL for India, RU-TIMES for
the Russian Federation, BLUES for Brazil and AIM/Enduse and DNE21+ for Japan. For both panels, CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases have been calculated
using the 100-year Global Warming Potential from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. The data is available in the source data.
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policies together leave a significant global implementation gap
with respect to the NDC targets by 2030, which is 7.7 (5.3–9.7)
GtCO2eq for emissions (see Table 3). This gap by 2030 can be
closed by increasing the low-carbon share by 2.8 pp (1.5–4.7 pp),
and decreasing energy intensity by 12.7% (9.1%–16.1%). Final
energy reductions under the NDC scenario compared with the
national policies scenario, occur especially in the transport and
buildings sector (see Fig. 2).
Uncertainty range. The different integrated assessment models
provide a range of outcomes for changes in greenhouse gas
emissions due to policy implementation between 2015 and 2030.
This range is a result of the differences in historical emissions21,
different assumptions about socio-economic growth rates, dif-
ferent impact of policy implementation in models, and finally real
uncertainty as a result of structural model differences (see
Methods). The differences in historical emissions are in line with
estimates of uncertainty in historical emission inventories (10% in
total greenhouse gas emissions)22, but it clearly translates into a
contribution to uncertainty for 2030. In addition, an estimate of
the contribution of socio-economic factors can be obtained by
comparing the 2015 and 2030 emission range under the No new
policies scenario. This shows a 2030 range that is 50% larger than
the 2015 range. The different impact of policies implemented in
models has been estimated by considering the impact of all
policies implemented in the models and estimating those that
Table 2 Absolute (GtCO2eq) and percentage impact of policy implementation relative to no new policies scenario, and
implementation gap with NDC scenario for the world, China, United States, India, EU, Japan, Brazil and Russian Federation
(median value and 10–90% in brackets).
Economy Absolute impact of policy
implementation relative to no
new policies scenario (GtCO2eq)
Percentage impact of policy
implementation relative to no
new policies scenario (%)
Absolute reductions
between national policies
and conditional NDCs
(GtCO2eq)
Percentage reductions
between national policies
and conditional NDCs (%)
World 3.5 (2.3, 5.2) 5 (4, 8) 7.7 (5.3, 9.7) 13 (9, 16)
China 0.7 (0.5, 2.3) 5 (2, 14) 0.9 (–0.5, 3.7) 6 (–3, 22)
United States 0.4 (0.3, 1.2) 6 (4, 13) 2.1 (1.5, 3.2) 31 (22, 38)
European Union 0.5 (0.3, 0.6) 9 (7, 15) 0.7 (0.6, 1.8) 19 (15, 33)
India 0.1 (0, 0.5) 3 (0, 7) 0.1 (–0.1, 0.3) 2 (–3, 6)
Japan 0.1 (0, 0.1) 7 (2, 8) 0 (0, 0.3) 4 (–4, 23)
Brazil 0.0 (0, 0.2) 3 (0, 11) 0.5 (0.2, 1) 30 (14, 44)
Russian Federation 0.0 (0, 0) 0 (0, 2) 0.1 (–0.1, 0.2) 3 (–3, 7)
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Fig. 2 Final energy and the low-carbon share of final energy on the global level and seven large countries under different scenarios. Average total final
energy for 2010, 2015 and 2030 of nine global integrated assessment models is subdivided into sectors: transport, buildings, industry and other. Total final
energy includes the 10th to 90th percentile ranges for total final energy (error bars). The black dots/triangles indicate final energy based on national model
estimates (China-TIMES and IPAC for China, GCAM-USA for the United States, PRIMES for the European Union, AIM India and India MARKAL for India,
RU-TIMES for the Russian Federation, BLUES for Brazil and AIM/Enduse and DNE21+ for Japan). The data is available in the source data.
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were not included based on the IMAGE model results (see
Methods). Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that
assumptions on socio-economic factors explain the largest part of
the ranges in the results for 2030; while the differences in policy
impact explain about 1/3 of them.
Impact of national policies for seven large G20 economies. The
scenarios allow for evaluation of climate policy at the national
level (although obviously limited by model detail). Policy
implementation is estimated to result in reductions of 0% (0–2%)
for the Russian Federation to 10% (4–12%) for the United States,
relative to the no new policies scenario (see Table 2). The largest
absolute emission reductions under the National policies scenario
occur in the CO2 energy supply and transport sector, in all
countries, except for Brazil, where reductions also occur in the
AFOLU sector (although AFOLU emission estimates are inher-
ently uncertain, already for historical estimates23). The largest
percentage of reductions is projected in the transport sector for
the United States and India, the industrial sector for the EU, and
the energy supply sector for China and Japan. In the Russian
Federation, the National policies scenario hardly triggers emission
reductions, compared to the no new policies scenario.
Implementation of national policies still leaves an implementa-
tion gap with NDCs of 3% (3–7%) for the Russian Federation to
28% (22–37%) for the United States (see Table 2). With national
policies until cut-off date before 2017, China, India, Japan and
Russian Federation are projected to come close to achieving their
NDC targets with national policies by 2030. In Brazil, the
European Union, and the United States, the median estimate of
the National policy scenario is further removed from the NDC
level. Note that very recent policy updates since 2017, or planned
policies in the pipeline to be implemented were not included. We
have compared the results of the global models also to the
outcomes of the same scenarios from national models from each
individual country. These results confirm the above trends,
although the absolute levels differ in a few cases (Figs. 1 and 2)
Global emissions gap and for seven large G20 countries. In
order to implement the objectives of the Paris Agreement, all
national policies together should reduce emissions enough to
keep global warming below the 2 °C and 1.5 °C temperature
limits. We evaluate this by comparing the results of the policy
scenarios with cost-optimal scenarios for these temperature tar-
gets. This shows a total emissions gap between the National
policies scenario and the cost-optimal scenarios in 2030 of 22.4
GtCO2eq (13.6–29.6) for the 2 °C limit (high probability), and
28.2 GtCO2eq (19.8–42.2) for the 1.5 °C limit (see Table 3 and
Fig. 3). This is respectively a global reduction of 36% (23–49%)
and 45% (33–65%) by 2030 relative to the national policies
scenario.
The Kaya identity allows to break this up into an energy mix
gap (share of low-carbon emitting technologies in final energy)
and an efficiency gap (final energy-intensity improvement relative
to the results of the implementation of national policies), and a
carbon-intensity gap (see Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2). To close
the gap by 2030 with the National policies scenario, the non-fossil
share would need to increase by 6.9 pp (4.0%–12.3%) (energy mix
gap), and the energy-intensity needs to improve by 9.6%
(4.8%–24.7%)) (efficiency improvement gap). These numbers
are 13.0% (7.2%–24.0%) and 17.5% (12.5%–26.8%) for the 1.5 °C
case (see Fig. 3). Global annual mitigation costs per GDP by 2030,
under the national policies scenario, are small, and increase to
0.9% (0.3%–2.2%) under the 2 °C scenario, and to 1.3%
(1.0%–4.0%) under the 1.5 °C scenario (see Fig. 3). The global
emissions gap with the 2 °C scenario can be reduced by a third, if
conditional NDCs would be fully implemented, leaving a median
ambition gap of 16.5 GtCO2eq (6.4–21.0) with 2 °C pathways and
21.2 GtCO2eq (12.2–31.6) with 1.5 °C pathways.
For the seven individual G20 countries, greenhouse gas
emissions by 2030 would need to decrease compared to the
national policies scenario by 25 to 41% (median) to stay on track
to keep temperature below 2 °C, while this is 33 to 54% (median)
under the 1.5 °C scenario (see Table 2 and Fig. 3). These gaps can
be closed by strongly increasing the low-carbon share of final
energy by 5.4 pp for the European Union to 8.5 pp for China to
stay below 2 °C, and between 5.4 pp in the European Union to
20.2 pp in China for the 1.5 °C case. Projections for final energy
intensity give a different picture, where the difference between the
National policies scenario and the 2 °C scenarios are small for the
European Union, Japan and the United States, somewhat larger
(and more uncertain) for Brazil, and largest for China, India and
the Russian Federation (See Fig. 3). Closing the gap between
national policies and 2 °C or 1.5 °C pathways by 2030 would
result in additional median mitigation costs per GDP of between
0.5% for the European Union to 2.8% for the Russian Federation
for the 2 °C case, while this is 0.6% to 3.4% for the 1.5 °C case (see
Fig. 3).
Mid-century impact of national policies. To give an indication
of the short-term impact of national policies in the context of the
long-term global targets, we present the indicator that is defined
as the cumulative emissions in the 2011–2050 period divided by
the 2010 emissions, and in addition assume countries pursue the
same national efforts between 2030 and 2050 under the National
policies scenario by keeping total percentage emission reductions
relative to the No new policies scenario constant. The indicator
allows for comparing countries with different absolute emission
Table 3 Absolute (GtCO2eq) and percentage emissions gaps by 2030, on the global level and for China, the United States, the
European Union, India, Japan, the Russian Federation and Brazil.
Absolute emissions gap
between national policies
and 2 °C scenarios
Absolute emissions gap
between national policies
and 2 °C scenarios
Emissions gap in percentages
between national policies and
1.5 °C scenarios
Emissions gap in percentages
between national policies and
2 °C scenarios
World 22.4 (13.6, 29.6) 36 (23, 49) 28.2 (19.8, 42.2) 45 (33, 65)
China 5.9 (4.2, 8.4) 41 (24, 59) 7.2 (5.3, 11) 53 (33, 66)
United States 2.3 (1.5, 3.9) 37 (24, 47) 2.9 (2.2, 5) 43 (33, 66)
European Union 1.6 (0.6, 1.9) 31 (14, 43) 1.4 (0.9, 3.1) 33 (25, 65)
India 2.1 (1.1, 2.7) 33 (21, 54) 2.6 (1.6, 3.2) 45 (34, 63)
Japan 0.4 (0.1, 0.5) 25 (14, 40) 0.5 (0.3, 0.6) 37 (28, 47)
Brazil 0.7 (0.4, 1) 40 (20, 70) 0.9 (0.4, 1.2) 54 (23, 83)
Russian Federation 0.9 (0.5, 1.2) 34 (23, 43) 1.3 (0.7, 1.9) 49 (26, 68)
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levels, and provides the number of years an economy can emit at
2010 emission levels while staying below the total cumulative
emissions of the next 40 years. A value of 40 indicates that, on
average, the emission level will remain constant. In the same way
as for the shorter period until 2030, comparison of the results
with the trajectories for the 2 °C and 1.5 °C maximum tempera-
ture increases shows a large gap (Fig. 4). Interestingly, the NDC
projections by 2050 for the European Union, Brazil, and the
United States are relatively close to the 2 °C scenario, suggesting
that these regions would mostly need to ensure that their national
policies more closely lead to the NDC target (which may possibly
already be achieved through very recent policy updates). It
should, however, be noted that cost-optimal implementation
(equal marginal costs in all regions) leads to higher costs, as a
percentage of GDP, in low-income regions and, therefore, is a fair
way to implement the Paris Agreement (see Supplementary
Note 3) only if complemented by financial transfers. Effort-
sharing approaches based on equity considerations tend to sug-
gest larger reduction targets for high-income regions24.
The 2 °C and 1.5 °C model ranges for Brazil are large as a result
of the uncertainty in land-use-related emissions. In terms of cost-
optimal mitigation, large reductions in each G20 economy are
necessary to stay within the 400 Gt carbon budget. The median
estimate for cumulative emissions relative to 2010, under this
scenario, is at a similar level, between 20 and 25, except for Brazil
and India, indicating that given the estimated cumulative
emissions in the national policies scenario, strong efforts are
essential by almost all countries.
Discussion
The results show that for all countries there is either a significant
implementation gap or ambition gap. Unless governments
increase ambition, the collective effort of current national policies
significantly stays short of the objectives of the Paris Agreement
and even fails to meet the joint ambition secured in NDCs. The
results have strong implications beyond 2030. Previous literature
has shown that inadequate near-term reduction efforts imply that
a substantially higher rate of transformation will be needed to
comply with the 2 °C limit11, stranded assets25 and substantially
higher mitigation costs in the long term, and reduced techno-
economic mitigation potential due to carbon lock-in26.
In all, 2 °C and 1.5 °C pathways in this study are calculated
assuming cost-optimal implementation, but it might not be the
most realistic approach to deriving national reduction targets, as
it would typically lead to relatively high costs in low-income
countries. In contrast, effort-sharing approaches based on equity
principles would lead to lower allowance of cumulative emissions
in the EU, Japan, the Russian Federation and the United States,
and to higher allowances for India (see Supplementary Fig. 3),
resulting in an opposite impact on the gap between national
policies and these allowances. If cost-effective climate policy
would be adopted, emission trading or transnational climate
financing could still ensure a cost-optimal implementation. If less
cooperation between countries is assumed, a different allocation
would increase total costs of implementation.
One crucial question that arises from this analysis is how to
speed up implementation to achieve NDCs, and increase ambi-
tion to stay on track to meet well below 2° goals? The current
policy implementation is weak and includes significant gaps (e.g.,
industry, freight transport policies). Moreover, it is also often
fragmented in terms of the use of policy instruments and the
coverage of sectors and countries. A redesign of current policy
mixes consisting of more coherent policies, including for instance
the use of economy-wide financial instruments27, may respond to
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the current call for strengthened policies. In practical terms, it is
possible to draw lessons from the policy mixes used in our ana-
lysis—for instance by identifying to most successful mitigation
measures. In identifying such good practices it is important
to evaluate measures in terms of cost effectiveness but also in
terms of reducing public policy constraints such as distribution of
costs28, ability to address uncertainty29, and political feasibility to
intervene in the economy30. A careful redesign in combination
with international cooperation could avoid carbon leakage to
other sectors and countries, avoid stranded assets31, and increase
regulatory power of governments.
In 2020, countries are expected to submit updated NDCs to the
Paris Agreement. However, the global stocktake discussed in this
article shows that large enhancements are necessary if we want to
maintain the window to limiting temperature increase to well
below 2 °C, or even pursue efforts to limit this to 1.5 °C. In order
to do so, all countries would need to accelerate the imple-
mentation of renewable technologies, while efficiency improve-
ments are especially important in emerging countries (China,
India, Brazil) and fossil-fuel-dependent countries (Russian Fed-
eration). From this we conclude that the global stocktake in the
Paris Agreement’s process would need to go beyond presenting
emission gaps, but insights and guidance for how to close this gap
are important. Integrated assessment models can support the
policy process. At first, the national policy scenario used in this
analysis could be assessed in more detail and give insights into the
impact of different individual policies. In addition, the models are
well furnished to present effective mitigation options to countries
for policy enhancement by giving the tradeoffs between impact
and costs of different policy packages in the context of global
efforts. Other effectiveness criteria could be captured with dif-
ferent scenarios. Finally, as the new policy questions require more
detailed information, model development could go into the
direction of including more countries, sectors and actors or link
to bottom-up energy and land use models.
Methods
Model exercise. The assessment of the impact of national climate policies on
greenhouse gas emissions is based on the model exercise that was done as part of
the CD-LINKS project, and for which guidelines were described in the global and
national model protocols32,33. This project aimed, among other things, to develop
global low development pathways on a global level and for G20 economies,
including an explicit representation of near-term policy trends. For this paper, we
selected seven large G20 economies in terms of greenhouse gas emissions (Brazil,
China, the EU, India, Japan, Russian Federation, United States), for which also
national climate and energy models were available in the project.
Integrated assessment models. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) describe
key processes in the interaction of human development and natural environment
and are designed to assess the implications of achieving climate objectives2,34. The
model exercise that assessed the impact of climate policies was done by nine IAMs
that have global coverage, and ten national models that represent a specific G20
economy (see Table 4). A more detailed description of model structure and policy
implementation can be found in the Supplementary Note 4, and for some models
at the IAMC wiki35. These models differ in country and sector aggregation level,
and also in the way they mimic decisions on climate policy. All models include
dynamic pricing, and therefore local climate policy will result in lower imple-
mentation in other regions with less policies. However, only the economic models
explicitly account for carbon leakage. In addition, as most models assume one
central planner, behaviour or decisions of different actors and the role of insti-
tutions is often not explicitly taken into account. This implies that most models
(especially with simple representation of the economy) have only a limited ability
to reflect the specific social and economic dynamics of the developing and tran-
sition economies36. Some phenomena, such as the green paradox, can only be
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represented by most models in an explicit scenario design. However, the models
with less economic detail often have a more detailed representation of technolo-
gies in different sectors enabling them to take into account technological learning.
Selection and model implementation of policies. Climate policy on the national
level, in this research, is defined as the result of climate policy formulation and
climate policy implementation that encompasses aspirational goals not secured by
legislation, national targets that are secured by legislation, and policy instruments
designed to implement these targets. Only implemented policies were included in
this analysis, and are defined as policies adopted by the government through
legislation or executive orders, and non-binding targets backed by effective policy
instruments.
First, climate policies were collected with the help of national experts and a
literature study (see Supplementary Table 2), and were stored in an open-access
database6. With the help of national experts, a selection of high-impact policies was
made and translated into model input indicators5. This inventory includes climate
and energy policies for the G20 economies, and details the instruments, targets and
sectors (see Table 5 and Source Data). It was evaluated with and expanded by
national experts in two rounds. The cut-off data for the selection of policies was 31
December 2016, and it should be noted that the policy environment is constantly
changing. Two policy changes with a possibly high impact have occurred since this
date: the United States is not likely to implement the 2025 standards for light-duty
vehicles, although current standards are implemented until 2021 (The Clean Power
plan, already was not included in the list of high-impact policies), and the
European Union adopted a comprehensive set of climate actions that goes beyond
the policies that we included in our analysis. In addition, although the United
States announced its withdrawal of the Paris Agreement, this would only enter into
effect by November 2020.
Policy instruments were represented in the integrated assessment as explicit as
possible, but simplification was sometimes necessary, thereby considering
replicating the impact on greenhouse gas emissions and energy as most important.
In practice, policy instruments are implemented to achieve national, often
aspirational goals (not secured by legislation or executive orders). These
Table 4 Participating integrated assessment models in the model exercise to assess the impact of climate policies.
Model Coverage
IAM model
Institute Model type
AIM V2.1 Global Kyoto University and National Institute for
Environmental Studies (NIES, Japan)
Recursive dynamic, general equilibrium
COPPE-COFFEE 1.0 Global/national Energy Planning Programme, COPPE, Universidade
Federal do Rio de Janeiro (COPPE, Brazil)
Perfect foresight, general equilibrium
DNE21+V.14 Global/national Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the
Earth (RITE, Japan)
Perfect foresight, partial equilibrium
GEM-E3 Global/national Institute of Communication and Computer Systems
(ICCS, Greece)
Recursive dynamic, General equilibrium
IMAGE 3.0 Global PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
(PBL, The Netherlands)
Recursive dynamic, partial equilibrium
MESSAGEix-
GLOBIOM_1.0
Global International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA, Austria)
Perfect foresight, general equilibrium
POLES CDL Global Joint Research Centre (JRC, EU) Recursive dynamic, partial equilibrium
REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0 Global Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK,
Germany)
Perfect foresight, general equilibrium
(REMIND) recursive dynamic, partial
equilibrium (MAgPIE)
WITCH2016 Global Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici
(CMCC, Italy)
Perfect foresight, general equilibrium
AIM/Enduse[Japan] National Kyoto University and National Institute for
Environmental Studies (NIES, Japan)
Recursive dynamic, partial equilibrium
AIM India [IIMA] National Indian Institute of Management (IIM, India) Recursive dynamic, general equilibrium
BLUES National Energy Planning Programme, COPPE, Universidade
Federal do Rio de Janeiro (COPPE, Brazil)
Perfect foresight, partial equilibrium
China TIMES National Tsinghua University (TU, China) Recursive dynamic, partial equilibrium
GCAM-USA_CDLINKS National Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, United
States)
Recursive dynamic, partial equilibrium
India MARKAL National The Energy Resources Institute (TERI, India) Dynamic least cost optimisation
IPAC-AIM/
technology V1.0
National National Development and Reform Commission
Energy Research Institute (NDRC-ERI, China)
Recursive dynamic, general equilibrium
PRIMES_V1 ICCS Institute of Communication and Computer Systems
(ICCS, Greece)
Perfect foresight, partial equilibrium
RU-TIMES 3.2 National National Research University-Higher School of
Economics (HSE, Russian Federation)
Perfect foresight, partial equilibrium
Table 5 Number of high-impact policies selected for implementation in the IAM models, per sector and country (details in,
Supplementary Table 3).
Sector Brazil China European Union India Japan Russian Federation United States of America Other G20 countries Total
Economy-wide 3 9 11 0 3 1 1 11 39
Energy supply 6 10 0 9 7 6 3 37 78
Transport 5 10 2 9 2 0 5 20 53
Buildings 1 1 2 0 1 1 6 4 16
Industry 0 3 0 4 1 0 0 1 9
AFOLU 4 3 0 2 2 0 1 8 20
Total 19 36 15 24 16 8 16 81 215
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aspirational goals are documented in national policy documents (e.g., National
Communication, strategy documents). In some cases, we could directly implement
policy instruments in IAMs, such as carbon taxes or regulations (e.g., vehicle fuel-
efficiency standards). In other cases, we included aspirational policy targets to
represent currently implemented policies, but only if they were backed by effective
policy instruments. This was for example the case with feed-in tariffs or renewable
auctions. If the policy instrument would end before the policy target year, we
assumed continuation of this instrument until the target year of the aspirational
goal. In case a G20 country is part of a larger model region, the policy (indicator) is
aggregated by assuming business-as-usual for those countries without policies, and
implementation of the policy for countries with policies32. In some cases, models
with less sector detail used policy indicators (such as CO2 or final energy reduction)
based on the impact of policies from more detailed models or on literature. See the
Supplementary Note 4 and Supplementary Table 4 for information on how policies
were implemented for each global model.
Scenarios. The starting point for the scenario design was the ADVANCE project10.
The National policies scenario corresponds to the inventory that contains energy
and climate policies implemented in G20 economies5. Between 42 and 94% of the
high-impact policies from the seven G20 economies were implemented in the nine
IAMs considered in this paper, and are estimated to represent 50 to 100% of
possible greenhouse gas reductions (see Supplementary Note 2 and Supplementary
Table 5). Note that global results also include G20 policies for Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia and South Africa,
which were not individually addressed in this paper. The national policies were
implemented for the period from 2010 to 2030, and equivalent effort was assumed
after 2030. This was defined as a constant percentage reduction relative to the No
new policies scenario or similar forms of continued ambition. The NDC scenario
was based on information from the NDCs on greenhouse gas reduction targets
energy and land-use policies and on additional information from Kitous et al.37,
den Elzen et al.38, Grassi et al.39 (land use estimates), and information from the
UNFCCC (see Supplementary Tables 6–8 for details). The NDC targets can be
divided into absolute emission reduction targets, business as usual reductions,
emission-intensity reductions, and projects absent of greenhouse gas emission
targets40. All G20 countries` NDCs are of the first three types. In general, NDC
targets for G20 economies are defined for the year 2030, but the US NDC target is
defined for the year 2025. The NDCs for China and India are represented by
greenhouse gas intensity targets, renewable targets and forestry measures, which
could not be translated into one specific absolute greenhouse gas emission level.
The 2 °C scenario assumes implementation of national policies until 2020 and cost-
optimal mitigation measures after 2020, to stay within the carbon budget of 1000
GtCO2 between 2011 and 2100. This is in line with the carbon budgets of 590 to
1240 GtCO2 from 2015 onwards, which would limit global warming by 2100 to
below 2 °C, relative to pre-industrial levels with at least 66% probability. The 1.5 °C
scenario starts with cost-optimal deep mitigation measures after 2020, and explores
the efforts necessary to keep global warming below 1.5 °C by 2100, with about 66%
probability, keeping cumulative carbon emissions within 400 GtCO2 between 2011
and 2100. Both budget assumptions are based on the ADVANCE project10, and in
line with the estimate for 66% probability from Table 2.2 from the IPCC AR5
Synthesis report41.
Indicators to track progress. To give insights into policy impact, we have used a
variant of the framework of tracking indicators related to the Paris Agreement7,8
(see Formula 1.1–1.3). CO2 per GDP can be decomposed into energy intensity
(final energy/GDP), low-carbon share of final energy (%), and utilisation rate
(CO2/fossil energy). The most pronounced differences between countries and
scenarios for these indicators are visible for the low-carbon share of final energy
(%) and energy intensity (final energy/GDP) (results are shown in Supplementary
Figs. 1 and 2), and are discussed in the article. However, not only was the impact of
policies on CO2 emissions analysed, but also total greenhouse gas emissions and
individual greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 energy, CO2 industrial processes, CO2
AFOLU, non-CO2). In addition, we have added mitigation costs per GDP to assess
the affordability of climate policy implementation. Partial equilibrium models such
as IMAGE and POLES report these costs in terms of area under the MAC curve
(e.g., direct mitigation costs), while equilibrium models such as MESSAGE,
REMIND and WITCH report in terms of consumption losses. MAC cost measures
tend to exclude existing distortions in the economy42. But as GDP is an exogenous
variable in partial equilibrium models, consumption loss is not available.
The Kaya decomposition is
CO2 ¼ POP*
GDP
POP
*
CO2
GDP
ð1:1Þ
CO2
GDP
¼ TPES
GDP
*
CO2
TPES
¼ TPES
GDP
*
FE
TPES
*
CO2
FE
¼ FE
GDP
*
CO2
FE
ð1:2Þ
CO2
GDP
¼ FE
GDP
*
FEfossil
FE
*
CO2
FEfossil
¼ FE
GDP
* 1 FEnonfossil
FE
 
*
CO2
FEfossil
ð1:3Þ
where
POP population, GDP gross domestic product, TPES primary energy, FE
final energy
Results. The results are presented (unless otherwise stated) using the median
estimate of all model results, and in addition presenting the 10th and 90th per-
centiles of these ranges. Differences in greenhouse gas emissions between scenarios
(e.g., implementation gap and total emissions gaps) are calculated by first taking
the difference per model and then determining the median and percentiles of the
range of differences.
The results from this study show that, for national policies, greenhouse gas
emissions by 2030 would be somewhat higher and for well below 2 °C scenarios
lower than earlier studies indicated2,4,42 (which were based on only one model or
had less detail on national policy implementation) (see Supplementary Figs. 4–7).
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Uncertainty. Emission growth under the National policies scenario by 2030 (See
Fig. 1) can be decomposed into five drivers that, together, represent the total
impact (blue bar in Fig. 5). First, historical calibration, which is calculated as the
difference between 2015 model emissions and the PRIMAP26 (version 1.2) data set.
Second, socio-economic growth assumptions, calculated as the emission growth
between 2015 and 2030 under the No policy scenario. Third, policy impact on
greenhouse gas emissions, calculated as the difference between 2030 emissions
under the No policy scenario and the National policies scenario, including an
estimate for the emission reductions for those policies (see Supplementary Table 5
and 9) that could not be implemented in certain models (See Supplementary
Note 2). Fourth, real uncertainty represented by model form and heterogeneity.
This shows that the impact of historical calibration on the projected global
growth in emissions between 2015 and 2030 is small; this growth is much more
dependent on socio-economic factors such as GDP and population growth. Of the
total impact, the policy impact is around one third, and a somewhat larger part is
real uncertainty.
Effort-sharing. The 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios assume cost-optimal implementation
of the reduction measures after 2020 with the lowest overall mitigation costs. The
result is implementation of measures in countries where this is cheapest, but this
does not imply that the implementing country would need to face all the costs.
These costs can be shared, and thus financed by other countries. The financial flows
could be calculated if emission allowances per country are based on so-called
effort-sharing approaches representing different equity principles24,43,44, for
example, categorise the effort-sharing approaches in the literature based on the
four basic equity principles, i.e., responsibility, equality, capability and cost effec-
tiveness, and present the regional greenhouse gas emission allowances in 2020,
2030 and 2050 for these categories. The equity principles were also applied to the
carbon budgets (cumulative emissions) for both the 2011–2050 and the 2011–2100
period24, based on calculations from the FAIR model45, see the Supplementary
Fig. 3, for comparison with the results from our study.
Model result adjustments. Some model results were adjusted due to missing data
on sectors and sub-sectors, different accounting approaches or too broad regional
definitions. The DNE21+ (on country level) does not include the Agricultural,
Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) sector. Therefore, these were supplemented with
average estimates from the other global models. Although the POLES model does
include AFOLU CO2 emissions, based on estimates from national communica-
tions, they were harmonised with those from FAOSTAT46, as the accounting
approaches of the individual countries were not consistent with the other IAMs.
The COPPE-COFFEE model does not include F-gas emissions, which were sup-
plemented with average estimates from the other global models. Some national
models only cover energy CO2 emissions (China TIMES, China IPAC-AIM V1.0,
AIM India, MARKAL India, PRIMES, RU-TIMES) and industrial CO2 emissions
and non-CO2 emissions were supplemented with average model estimates from
global models.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
Data reported in Figs. 1–5 and the selection of policies implemented in IAMs can be
found in the Source Data. The source data files are also available at [https://doi.org/
10.17632/2j7sksfh2h.1. The list of policies is based on the open source Climate Policy
Database. The scenario protocol and the selection of high-impact policies that were
included in the protocol are found under Work Package 2 of the deliverables &
publications page of the CD-LINKS project. Model results can be found in the open-
access CD-LINKS database. Policy relevant data is available in the Global Stocktake tool.
CD-LINKS inventory http://www.climatepolicydatabase.org/index.php/
CDlinks_policy_inventory; Climate policy database http://climatepolicydatabase.org/
index.php/Climate_Policy_Database; Deliverables & publications http://www.cd-links.
org/?page_id=620; CD-LINKS database https://db1.ene.iiasa.ac.at/CDLINKSDB/dsd?
Action=htmlpage&page=30; Global Stocktake tool https://themasites.pbl.nl/global-
stocktake-indicators/.
Code availability
The code from the 20 integrated assessment models is not available in a publicly
shareable version, although several have published open source code, visualisation tools
or detailed documentation (see Supplementary Table 10 for details). A model description
(see Supplementary Note), and a description of how national climate policies have been
implemented (see Supplementary Table 4) is available.
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